The ternary xV2O5–(40 − x)Li2O–60B2O3 glass system, where x = 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 mol%, was prepared by normal quenching. Ultrasonic velocities and attenuation were measured at room temperature using a pulse-echo technique. Various parameters, such as elastic moduli, micro-hardness, Poisson's ratio and Debye temperature, were determined from the measured densities and velocities. The composition dependence of these parameters, in addition to the glass-transition temperature, suggested that vanadium ions were incorporated into these glasses as a network modifier, resulting (...) in the reconversion of BO4 tetrahedra to BO3 triangles by the breaking of B–O–B linkages and the formation of nonbridging oxygens (NBOs). The outcome was a reduction in network connectivity and rigidity with increasing V2O5 content. The results are explained quantitatively in terms of fractal bond connectivity, average atomic volume, network dimensionality, packing density, number of network bonds per unit volume, cross-link density and atomic ring size. The Makishima and Mackenzie model appears to be valid for the studied glasses when the fate of BO4 tetrahedra and creation of NBOs are taken into account. (shrink)

Purpose. The study seeks to clarify the preconditions for moral and legal decision-making based on the identification of axiological foundations that correlate with the moral perceptions of good and evil and psychological phenomena such as emotions. Theoretical basis of the study is to apply comparative, axiological, systemic methods. This methodological approach allows us to analyze and disclose the essence of the process of moral and legal decision-making on the basis of certain axiological prerequisites and enables to substantiate the connection between (...) the axiological and psychological aspects of taking moral and legal decisions. Originality of the work is to broaden the perceptions of the processes and mechanisms for making moral and legal decisions, which are based on the axiological dimension, in particular on the system of reference individual and social values. The study shows that every necessary moral and legal decision taken by a person is futurologically balanced in the emotional sense, rationally reasoned and morally perceptible in the context of man’s beliefs about good and evil, and realized with necessity in the personal system of reference values that determines the style and manner of individual and social behaviour in the context of material and spiritual values and is an axiological foundation for making all types of moral and legal decisions. Conclusions. Moral and legal decision-making is a social process that is connected with such a social essence of a person as rationality, which gives an opportunity to act axiologically. A person makes moral and legal decisions in a complex way, based on the unity of the moral, axiological and psychological aspects of his worldview, which are grounded on the system of reference values. (shrink)

Of the many questions to which the RST has given rise, I should like to single out two groups.

In his discussion of the tragic act in Poet. 14. 1453b15 ff. Aristotle separates the pity which we feel at mere suffering from pity roused by the way in which this suffering is or will be brought about. The revenge of an enemy is not in itself pitiable. We pity, if victim and agent are closely related to one another as members of the same family, but only if the action is of a certain kind. Four possible ways of presenting (...) the tragic act are therefore distinguished: attempted but not performed, with knowledge of the relevant facts ; performed with knowledge ; performed but in ignorance, recognition following later ; attempted in ignorance but not performed, since recognition occurs in time to prevent it. Of these four variations the first is censured on the ground that it is morally shocking without being tragic, since it lacks πάθος. The second is mentioned in b27 as the favourite of the older poets, but is here passed over without comment. The third is explicitly approved on the ground that it avoids moral shock and has the emotional κπληξις of the recognition. But for some reason which he does not state, Aristotle prefers the last, where recognition is in time to prevent the tragic suffering from actually taking place. (shrink)